

PUBLIC OPINION AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Russell J. Dalton, Wilhelm Bürklin, and Andrew Drummond

Russell J. Dalton, director of the Center for the Study of Democracy at the University of California–Irvine, is editor of *Parties Without Partisans* (2001) and *Critical Masses* (1999). **Wilhelm Bürklin** holds the Lehrstuhl “Regierungssystem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland” at the University of Potsdam and is a member of the Management Board of the Association of German Banks (BdB); his recent books include *Eliten in Deutschland: Rekrutierung und Integration* (1997) and *Wahlen und Wählerverhalten* (1998). **Andrew Drummond** is a Democracy Fellow in the Center for the Study of Democracy and a doctoral candidate in political science at UC-Irvine.

Over the past quarter-century, tensions have grown in most Western nations between the existing processes of representative democracy and calls by reformists for a more participatory style of democratic government. Voter turnout is down, as is public trust in parties and representative institutions generally. These signs point to growing public dissatisfaction with the current system of representative democracy.¹

At the same time, popular demands for new direct forms of political involvement and decision making, especially referenda, have increased in many Western democracies.² But the potential for political change goes far beyond referenda. In most Western democracies, more people today are signing petitions, joining citizen interest groups, and engaging in unconventional forms of political action.³ Citizens are also calling for a greater role in government advisory and administrative bodies, especially at the local level.

Some even ask if democratic nations are shifting wholesale from representative democracy toward a more participatory approach. President Clinton’s former adviser Dick Morris, a highly pragmatic political analyst, recently concluded that “the fundamental paradigm that dominates our politics is the shift from representative to direct democracy. Voters want to run the show directly and are impatient with

all forms of intermediaries between their opinions and public policy.”⁴ Do people want more direct involvement in the political process in a way that threatens to erode the historical reliance on the institutions of representative democracy?

This article examines the tension between representative and direct democracy as displayed in the attitudes of contemporary Europeans. In addition, we examine the factors that drive these opinions, illuminating what may be in store for all the advanced industrial democracies. We draw our evidence from a variety of sources: A recent survey of the German public gives detailed insight into opinions in one key nation, and supplementary evidence is taken from the Eurobarometer survey of the 15 member states of the European Union.

We focus on two major forms of democratic rule: representative and direct democracy. Although there are many potential forms of democracy, the political debate has generally emphasized this dichotomy.⁵ On one side of the democratic spectrum stands the model of articulating citizen demands through representation. This model often takes the form of party-based parliamentary rule and functions primarily through elected representatives. Citizens express their preferences at elections, but public policy is actually made by the representatives that the citizenry selects. In a variety of forms, this has been the system of choice in nearly every modern democracy.

At the other end of the spectrum is the model of direct democracy, placing control of government in the hands of the people themselves. This model argues that citizens themselves can make wise decisions on political matters, whether through referenda, town meetings, citizen initiatives, or other direct means.

One of the most common criticisms of direct democracy has been that it is unable to function efficiently in large polities. In these cases, party government streamlines the decision-making process, inevitably resulting in a system of representative rule. To counteract the negatives associated with representative rule—such as the centralization of decision-making power in elites—the process may be modified by such measures as term limits and rotation principles.

The Case of Germany

The history of the Federal Republic of Germany has long mirrored this debate.⁶ During the country’s creation following World War II, its constitutional framers eradicated the elements of direct democracy that had existed in the Weimar constitution and opted for a system of strong representative democracy—an institutional response to the political instability of the Weimar era, as well as a reflection of their general distrust of the people’s capacity to act wisely. The subsequent development of the communist regime in the German Democratic

Republic (GDR) further stigmatized the image of direct democracy in the West.

The forerunner of the contemporary push for direct democracy in Germany was the leftist student movement of the 1960s, which clamored for transparent democracy and demanded direct citizen participation in political decision making. Shaped by anti-institutional values, these demands questioned the dominant paradigm of representative democracy. The more moderate of these critics wanted to create a new type of direct democracy and expand the autonomy of the people through referenda, open-government reforms, and greater popular control over elites. The more radical elements, influenced by the example of the “people’s democracies” of the Eastern Bloc, demanded the implementation of an advisory system based on communist principles.

Later, the Green party would pick up the mantle of direct democracy and, in fact, would identify direct democracy as one of its three founding principles. The party signaled its opposition to entrenched elitism by adopting a rotation policy for office holders, prohibiting multiple office holding, and enacting other internal reforms. Outside their party, the Greens advocated, albeit unsuccessfully, the introduction of direct-democratic institutional reforms. In 1992, for example, the Greens offered legislative proposals calling for the incorporation of citizen initiatives and referenda into the Basic Law, but they failed even to muster a legislative quorum for debate. Since entering the government in 1998, however, they have downplayed the issue.

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, discussions of democratic reform in Germany have begun to take another direction. Demands for direct democracy can still be heard, and still come mostly (but not always) from the left. But the major action now is at the communal and regional levels.⁷ Since 1990, seven states (the five new states of the former East Germany, plus Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony) have passed new constitutions with referendum provisions. In fact, the new eastern state constitutions feature an array of direct-participation devices, ranging from state legislative initiatives to the recall of locally elected mayors. Other reforms are expanding citizen participation in local administrative and planning processes, and several states are incorporating referenda and citizen initiatives in local community affairs. Thus some German analysts claim that there appears to be an irreversible long-term “trend from representative democracy to a widened participatory democracy.”⁸

We would argue that the German experience parallels a trend found in other advanced industrial democracies. In the process of European unification, popular consultation has almost become a prerequisite for constitutional political change, as illustrated by the referenda in Denmark, France, Ireland, Norway, and Sweden that have recently shaped the integration process. Switzerland has long integrated referenda into its unique style of democratic politics, and political groups in Italy

increasingly rely on referenda as policy tools. In the United States, the frequency of state-level referenda has more than tripled since the 1950s, according to the Initiative and Referendum Institute. Even in Great Britain, the paragon of representative democracy, the referendum is now often proposed as a preferable and “more democratic” way of deciding especially problematic political issues, ranging from EU membership, to Scottish or Welsh “devolution,” to electoral reform in the House of Commons. Popular sovereignty is apparently gaining over parliamentary sovereignty as the basis for democratic rule.

Public Attitudes Toward the Two Faces of Democracy

Perhaps ironically, debate over representative versus direct democracy has been largely an elite affair. Consistent with the principles of representative democracy, the public itself has seldom been directly consulted. Rather, politicians and political analysts discuss what the public wants or expects (which often overlaps with the speaker’s own preferences).

So how do Germans—and Europeans more generally—view the choice between these two models of democracy? Admittedly, this is a difficult concept to examine in a public opinion survey because it goes beyond the simple topics best measured by polling. In addition, democracy is a process that may involve several different institutional elements.

One can glimpse the broad contours of public preferences through a question included in the 1998 German Election Study that asked about the principles underlying representative democracy and direct democracy.⁹ The Table on the facing page presents the distribution of opinions in 1998 and in a comparable 1991 Allensbach Institut survey. Most Germans lean toward giving the public a greater say in important political decisions, a preference that has strengthened slightly since 1991.

Furthermore, support for direct democracy is greater in the former GDR states. In 1998, 61 percent of Easterners favored more direct democracy, compared to 53 percent in the West. Although East-West differences have narrowed since 1991, they appear to be a political legacy of Germany’s division. This divide likely reflects Easterners’ support for forms of consultative democracy, such as the roundtables that were used during the democratic transition. At the same time, Easterners appear to be skeptical of the conflict and loss of control that accompanies representative democracy.¹⁰

Thus German public opinion seems to favor participatory reforms of the democratic process. To the extent that comparable evidence is available, the same sentiments appear to exist in other advanced industrial democracies. Thomas Cronin, for instance, has found that 76 percent of Americans believe the citizenry should have a direct say on more

TABLE—GERMAN SUPPORT FOR REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY (PERCENTAGES)

	1991			1998		
	WEST	EAST	TOTAL	WEST	EAST	TOTAL
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY	39	18	35	41	30	39
DIRECT DEMOCRACY	47	67	51	53	61	55
NOT SURE	14	15	14	6	9	7

Source: 1991 Allensbach Institut; 1998 German Election Study, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin.

policy issues.¹¹ Survey data from Finland and Denmark also demonstrate broad support for the principle of direct democracy.¹²

Two 1995 MORI polls in Britain similarly show that

three-quarters of the public approve of referenda. Indeed, public opinion surveys suggest that citizens broadly endorse the principle of referenda for dealing with important public policy issues.


The patterns in German public opinion also appear in the Europe-wide results. The Eurobarometer survey asked respondents if they approved of the Swiss form of direct democracy, such as the greater use of referenda.¹³ The Swiss constitution requires that constitutional changes be submitted to a popular referendum; in addition, citizens can call for a referendum on federal laws and can propose constitutional reforms via a referendum. Thanks to these multiple options, the Swiss hold an average of ten referenda per year. Among those Europeans who express an opinion, 70 percent are positive about the direct democracy of the Swiss political system. The Figure on the following page shows that a majority in each nation expresses these sentiments, ranging from 53 percent in Denmark to 82 percent in Belgium. In summary, although contemporary democracies may be built upon the principles of representative democracy, the available opinion polls suggest that most people in Western democracies favor reforms that would move toward a more participatory style of democratic government.

Who Supports Direct Democracy?

A key question is, “What are the patterns of support for a shift toward direct democracy?” From the existing political debates and scholarly research on direct democracy, one can extract two explanations that have contrasting implications. The *New Politics* explanation maintains that the new values and skills of people today are bringing about a sea change in the way they view politics.¹⁴ In contrast, the *political dissatisfaction* explanation argues that unease with the way representative democracy currently functions (as opposed to the way it is supposed to work in principle) may be stimulating support for direct democracy as an alternative. Which explanation is best?

The “New Politics” explanation. This account is grounded in the changing values and political skills of contemporary publics. In several

FIGURE—SUPPORT FOR THE SWISS FORM OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY (PERCENTAGES)



Source: Eurobarometer 47 (March–April 1997). “Don’t know” responses were not included in the calculation of percentages.

publications, Ronald Inglehart argues that, across the Western world, modernization processes are fostering a new range of “postmaterialist” political interests and altering expectations about the appropriate role of the citizen. These postmaterialist values should generate support for a new participatory style of politics that emphasizes basic democracy, public interest groups, and other forms of direct action, while simultaneously casting doubt on hierarchical authority structures such as parties and the representative system.

Moreover, these same forces of social modernization expand the political skills and resources of average citizens. The average European voter has far more years of schooling than was the

case just a few decades ago, and political information is more widely and easily available than ever. Thus modernization increases the number of citizens who feel competent to make political decisions without deferring to political elites.

Consequently, the “New Politics” approach implies that support for direct democracy should be more common among the social and political groups identified as supporters of the Greens and the *Alternativ* political movement (environmentalists, women’s groups, and other new social movements) within Europe: the young, the better educated, and the postmaterialists. Generational change, for example, is closely intertwined with the appeal of the Greens and the participatory style of the 1960s generation and subsequent youth cohorts. Indeed, research on postmaterialist values generally documents the tendencies of young Europeans to desire more say in politics and more control over the decisions that affect their lives, and to express more support for protest and other forms of direct political action. Thus it seems almost inevitable that younger generations would be one source of support for direct democracy.

Despite this logic, there is a striking lack of generational differences in public opinion. In western Germany, for instance, 51 percent of those

under age 30 prefer the direct democracy option, but 49 percent of those 60 and older agree. The patterns across age groups in eastern Germany are similarly weak. Generation is not a source of changing attitudes toward these two models of democracy.

The “New Politics” thesis also implies that support for direct democracy should be greater among the better educated and the more politically sophisticated. Those who possess the political skills and resources that enable them to deal with the complexities of politics may desire a larger political role in the democratic process. Furthermore, German universities have bred support for the Greens and participatory politics over the past generation, and better-educated youth are a core constituency for the Greens and their calls for basic democracy.

Yet empirical reality once again falls short of our expectations. Rather than being the ideal of the politically engaged, direct democracy attracts greater support from those Germans who are *least interested* in politics. In western Germany, for instance, 75 percent of the least interested favor direct democracy, compared to only 34 percent among the most interested. In eastern Germany, the gap narrows to 69 versus 57 percent but still persists. A similar pattern exists for education: As education increases, support for direct democracy decreases.¹⁵

These patterns are not unique to Germany. Repeating the analyses with the question on direct democracy from *Eurobarometer 47* yields similar relationships. For example, 75 percent of less-educated Europeans support direct democracy, a figure that declines to 66 percent among the better educated. Similarly, 74 percent of those who describe themselves as not politically informed favor the Swiss model of direct democracy, versus 62 percent of those who claim to be well informed. Analyses of Denmark and Finland also find greater support for direct democracy among the less educated and those less interested in politics.¹⁶

The most direct way to judge the “New Politics” explanation with the data at hand is to compare support for direct democracy with partisan preferences. In Germany, one would expect Green party adherents to be the strongest advocates of direct democracy, supporters of the more conservative parties to oppose reform, and Social Democrats to hold an intermediate position. We find, however, that sympathy for the Greens is virtually unrelated to support for direct democracy, in both western and eastern Germany.¹⁷ The Greens’ calls for “basic democracy” have apparently fallen on deaf ears. While it is true that supporters of the Christian Democrats and the Free Democratic Party generally lean toward representative democracy, what is most striking is the strong support for direct democracy among adherents of all the other minor parties. Supporters of the postcommunist Party of Democratic Socialism, the far right Republican party, and the extreme right German People’s Union all lean toward direct democracy, implying that such a preference is a

sentiment of protest parties (of both ideological extremes) rather than a reflection of Green politics.

Our findings thus argue against interpreting public support for direct democracy as an extension of the democratic rhetoric of the *Alternativ* movement in Germany and the rest of Europe. Direct democracy receives relatively greater support among those at the margins of politics: the less interested, the less educated, and those who support protest parties. This should raise questions about the implications of adopting direct democracy—a point to which we return below.

The “political dissatisfaction” explanation. In their examination of the past decade’s substantial political change, several scholars have presented evidence that Germans and other Europeans have grown less satisfied with the institutions of representative democracy and the way that the democratic process works.¹⁸ Indeed, popular calls for direct democracy reforms are often linked to the desire to overcome the inefficiency or political biases of party-based government. Those who feel frustrated or disenfranchised by representative democracy may yearn for an alternative political system, with direct democracy being one option. Or individuals may merely be dissatisfied with the specific policies of their governments and may be expressing a preference for greater input. Such an explanation would be consistent with the greater support for direct democracy that we find among adherents of protest parties.

The available public opinion evidence suggests a strong link between political dissatisfaction and support for direct democracy. In Germany, for example, dissatisfaction with the way democracy functions leads to greater support for direct democracy. Among West Germans only 33 percent of the most satisfied group favor direct democracy—a figure that rockets to 77 percent among those who are not at all satisfied. This relationship is slightly stronger in the West than in the East.

Other public opinion data display this same pattern.¹⁹ For instance, satisfaction with political parties is negatively correlated with Germans’ support for direct democracy. Similarly, a series of items measuring confidence in politicians reveals an inverse relationship between the level of such confidence and support for direct democracy, although these relationships are weaker than for system support or party trust. In addition, policy dissatisfaction is strongly related to preferences for direct democracy in both western and eastern Germany.

The evidence from *Eurobarometer 47* confirms these same general patterns for Europe as a whole. Among Europeans who are very satisfied with the democratic process, 62 percent approve of the Swiss model of direct democracy; this opinion increases to 74 percent among those who are not at all satisfied. Those who think the government is responsive to the public are less likely to approve of direct democracy (61 percent)

than people who feel the government is more concerned about its own interests (73 percent).

In summary, it appears that political dissatisfaction within the Federal Republic (and in Europe as a whole) is stoking support for political reform—in this case, advocacy for direct democracy. This indicates not so much acceptance of the lofty goals of the postmaterialist Green movement or Willy Brandt's challenge to "risk more democracy" as dissatisfaction with the process of representative democracy as it works in the nation today. Indeed, after a decade or more spent discussing political and party disenchantment (*Politikverdrossenheit*), it appears that those Germans who hold such feelings have distilled their discontent into calls for a basic restructuring of the political system—a process that has been paralleled in Europe as a whole.²⁰

Possible Benefits, Possible Dilemmas

It is essential to consider both the positive and the negative consequences that direct democracy may bring. Because of the "participatory revolution" in Germany and Europe, however, one has the impression that criticism of direct democracy is an affront to political correctness. A sort of Jeffersonian ethos seems to prevail, holding that the standard cure for the problems of democracy is more democracy. Thus defending representative democracy is seen as regressive and almost undemocratic—an ironic reversal of the prevailing wisdom of the early postwar era. Consequently, the possible dilemmas stemming from direct democracy have not been fully considered in the European context.

On the positive side, expanding the political role of ordinary citizens can have beneficial consequences. As Wolfgang Luthardt argues, instruments of direct democracy can lead to greater social integration and eventually contribute to a stabilization of the political system by heightening popular control, balancing societal interests, and giving the public a veto function.²¹ For example, the participatory pressures from Greens and other alternative social movements in Europe helped to ensure the representation of important societal interests that were previously underrecognized, thereby broadening the policy responsibilities and representativeness of democratic polities. Support for direct democracy by those on the periphery may similarly help to create a mechanism to reincorporate these alienated individuals.

Direct democracy may also enhance the legitimacy of the political process. When levels of public confidence in the basic elements of the party system—such as trust in political parties and politicians—are low, a more populist base of political legitimacy may stimulate new trust in the system. In Western Europe, for instance, direct democracy is increasingly used to settle conflicts between party elites by referring contentious issues to the people. This pattern suggests that the institutions

of representative democracy have become less capable of dealing with difficult political controversies and that referenda are now considered a stronger source of political legitimacy on contentious issues. Such expansions of the democratic process in the past have contributed to the vitality of democracy today.

On the negative side, one of the greatest problems with direct democracy is that it must reduce all decisions to simple yes-or-no

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alternatives. Given the complexity of political circumstances in modern societies and the necessity for compromise, expanding the use of such decision making could strain the fabric of democracy. In addition, the structure of direct democracy is deceptively simple, and there are few options for amendment and revision once the public has spoken. The loss of these deliberative aspects of democracy may lessen the wisdom of democratic decisions.

Another question touches on the age-old problem of wisdom and consent. It asks whether voters will

possess the skills required to make wise choices on important policy issues. This has been a repeated question in the historical evolution of democratic rights, and it carries over into the debate on referenda and other forms of direct democracy. If the pressure for these new reforms came from the better educated and more sophisticated, one might be more sanguine about the expansion of direct democracy. When these reforms are supported by those at the margins of politics, however, it raises doubts about how citizens will actually perform in an expanded democratic role.

Moreover, even the advocates of these reforms may be misjudging the likely consequences of direct democracy. The public calls for direct democracy in Europe often arise from the demands of the Greens and other alternative groups for more government transparency and greater opportunities for political participation. Yet our evidence shows that popular support for direct democracy tends to come from a different constituency. It reflects a rejection of the political status quo and stands closer to the populism of Jörg Haider or Ross Perot than to the Greens' ideology.

The public opinion patterns we have pointed to are found throughout Europe. They raise questions about whether direct democracy in Europe will actually lead to the kinds of policies that its advocates predict. Since the greatest popular support for direct democracy is located among

citizens at the periphery of politics—the less interested, the less informed, and the adherents of extreme parties—these reforms might encourage the nativist and populist tendencies that exist in Europe today. Aspects of the Swiss and American experiences suggest that direct democracy can provide a tool for majority action against unpopular minorities.²² With respect to foreigners, for example, a politically mobilized European citizenry might endorse policies that restrict immigration and the rights of foreign residents. More broadly, direct democracy may become a tool for established political interests to court public support for their causes, unmediated by political parties or elites. Direct democracy can easily become plebiscitary democracy.

Our evidence cannot resolve these debates, but the patterns of popular support for direct democracy we have found suggest that it is important to engage in an analysis of these issues. Moreover, we need to put aside ideological presuppositions or wishful thinking that might color our judgments about the real costs and benefits of direct democracy. Most Western democracies are hearing increasing public demands for direct forms of popular involvement in the policy process, and more thoughtful and systematic evaluations of the potential effects of such reforms are badly needed.

NOTES

A more extensive statistical analysis of the German survey data is forthcoming in Wilhelm Bürklin et al., “Zwei Gesichter der Demokratie: Repräsentative versus ‘direkte’ Demokratie,” in Max Kaase and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., *Die 1998 Bundestagswahl* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002). We want to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung for providing the funds to include the question in the 1998 German Election Study; the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the UC Center for German and European Studies also supported this.

1. Mark Gray and Miki Caul, “Declining Voter Turnout in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1950 to 1997: The Effects of Declining Group Mobilization,” *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (November 2000): 1091–1122; Susan J. Pharr, Robert D. Putnam, and Russell J. Dalton, “Trouble in the Advanced Democracies? A Quarter-Century of Declining Confidence,” *Journal of Democracy* 11 (April 2000): 7–25; Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

2. Ian Budge, *The New Challenge of Direct Democracy* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996); Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri, eds., *The Referendum Experience in Europe* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996); David Butler and Austin Ranney, eds., *Referendums Around the World* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1994).

3. Russell Dalton, *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 3rd ed. (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 2002), ch. 4; M. Kent Jennings and Jan van Deth, eds., *Continuities in Political Action* (Berlin: DeGruyter, 1989).

4. Dick Morris, *The New Prince* (Los Angeles: Renaissance Books, 1999).

5. David Held, *Models of Democracy*, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).

6. Susan Scarrow, "Party Competition and Institutional Change: The Expansion of Direct Democracy in Germany," *Party Politics* 3 (October 1997): 451–72; Wolfgang Luthardt, *Direkte Demokratie* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1994).

7. Gemeinsame Verfassungskommission, *Bericht*. Bundestag-Drucksache 12/6000, 5 November 1993, Bonn; Wolfgang Fischer, "Formen unmittelbarer Demokratie im Grundgesetz," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 52–53 (December 1993): 16–18; Wolfgang Luthardt, "Probleme und Perspektiven direkter Demokratie in Deutschland," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte* 14–97 (March 1997): 13–22.

8. Günther Rüter, ed., *Repräsentative oder plebiszitäre Demokratie* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996); Heinrich Oberreuter, "Repräsentative und plebiszitäre Element als ergänzende politische Prinzipien," in Günther Rüter, ed., *Repräsentative oder plebiszitäre Demokratie*.

9. The German Post-election Study 1998 (DNW) is a cooperative undertaking of the Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung (MZES), the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB), the Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung, Cologne and the Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (ZUMA), Mannheim. The interviews were conducted between 28 September 1998 (a day after the election) and 17 October 1998. The total sample size is $n = 2019$; $n = 978$ in the West and $n = 1041$ in the East. The results presented here are based on the weighted sample. Also see Max Kaase and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., *The 1998 Bundestagswahl* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2002). The question wording was as follows:

Two people are discussing different forms of democracy. Which of the two opinions presented here is what you also think?

- *I am for a representative democracy, in which the public elects the parliament and then the parliament meets and takes responsibility for addressing political decisions. The deputies are better informed.*
- *I am for a direct democracy that as much as possible decides many political decisions by referenda. Then exactly what the people want will happen.*

We wanted a balanced question so that both options might appear reasonable to the survey respondent. For the original German wording, see www.journalofdemocracy.org/dalton.htm. For more information on the Allensbach questions see Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, "Was ist anders als 1994?" Dokumentation des Beitrags in der *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 February 1998, p. 5.

10. Richard Hofferbert and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, "Democracy and its Discontents in Post-Wall Germany," research paper of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2000.

11. Thomas Cronin, *Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative, Referendum, and Recall* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 80. The 1972 and 1976 American National Election Studies included a question asking if respondents felt "more issues should be decided at the polls." In both surveys approximately 80 percent agreed with this option.

12. Pertti Pesonen, ed., *Suomen EU-kansanaanestys 1994: Raportti aanestajien kannanotoista* (The 1994 EU referendum in Finland) (Helsinki: Pääntuskeskus Oy, 1994); Palle Svensson, "The Danes and Direct Democracy," paper prepared for the workshop on "The Referendum Experience in Europe" at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Madrid, 1996.

13. *Eurobarometer 47.1: Images of Switzerland* (March–April 1997). The question wording is: "The Swiss system of direct democracy, that is to say frequent votes and referenda, etc., works well and should be considered as a model." Because this question presumes a knowledge of the Swiss system, nearly 40 percent of the survey respondents gave a "don't know" response to this question. The "don't know" responses are not included in the calculation of percentages in the Figure on p. 146 above.

14. Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Ronald Inglehart, "Postmodernization, Authority and Democracy," in Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens*; see also Russell Dalton, "Cognitive Mobilization and Partisan Dealignment in Advanced Industrial Democracies," *Journal of Politics* 46 (February 1984): 264–84.

15. For data on the educational differences in support for direct democracy, see www.journalofdemocracy.org/dalton.htm.

16. Pertti Pesonen, ed., *Suomen EU-kansanaanestys 1994*; Palle Svensson, "The Danes and Direct Democracy."

17. The statistical data are reported in Wilhelm Bürklin et al., "Zwei Gesichter der Demokratie."

18. Dieter Fuchs, "The Democratic Culture of Unified Germany," in Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens*; Wilhelm Bürklin et al., *Eliten in Deutschland*, ch. 12 (Leverkusen: Leske and Budrich, 1997); Susan J. Pharr, Robert D. Putnam, and Russell J. Dalton, "Trouble in the Advanced Democracies?"

19. For a table summarizing these relationships with support for direct democracy, see www.journalofdemocracy.org/dalton.htm.

20. A similar relationship between dissatisfaction and calls for institutional reform in Britain contributed to the substantial constitutional reforms of the Blair government. See John Curtice and Roger Jowell, "Trust in the political system," in Roger Jowell et al., eds., *British Social Attitudes—The 14th Report* (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth, 1997).

21. Wolfgang Luthardt, *Direkte Demokratie*, 157ff.

22. Todd Donovan and Shawn Bowler, "Direct Democracy and Minority Rights," *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (July 1998): 1020–24.